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Abstract
Islam explores the link between information  flows and  assess better information flows. One  index is based on
governance or institutional quality. Economic theory  the existence of freedom  of information  laws. A second
expounds on the importance  of information on  index called  the "transparency"  index measures the
economic outcomes either through  its direct  effect on  frequency  with which economic data are published  in
prices and quantities or through its effect on other  countries around the world.  Empirical analysis shows
factors such as institutions  and the quality of governance.  that countries which  have better information flows as
She shows that countries with better information  flows  measured by both indicators  have better quality
also govern better. Two kinds of indicators  are used to  governance.
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her excellent research assistance.Information is a critical ingredient in efficient, well-functioning  markets, both economic and
political. More information allows better analysis, and better monitoring and evaluation of
events which are significant for people's economic  and social well-being. It allows economic and
political decision-makers to evaluate opportunities  and manage risks better. It allows for the
possibility that decisions in economic and political markets will enhance social welfare. The
importance of information in markets for different types of goods and services has long been
recognised  in theory (Ackerlof,  1970,  Stigler,. 1961, Stiglitz with Rothschild,1976,  Stiglitz with
Grossman,  1980,  Stiglitz and Weiss,  1981, Braverman and Stiglitz,  1986, Stiglitz, 1984,  1987a,
1987b,  1987c,  1988,  1989, 2002,  among others). Modem macroeconomics  as well as
microeconomics  and finance are based on theories of how expectations  are formed using the
information available to decision-makers and how these expectations translate into actions which
affect future outcomes. These theories focus not only on how much information there is but also
on how people use that information.  A plethora of authors have investigated the effects of
information on stock markets and on bank loans and interest rates. In the aftermath of the recent
financial crises around the world several empirical papers have looked at how information might
be used to predict crises and/or adapt policy to prevent crises (Wirjanto,  1989, Chote ed.,1998,
and Chowdhry and Goyal, 2000). Jappelli and Pagano (1993 and 2001), Galindo and Miller
(2001), Faukenheim & Powell (forthcoming),  and Barron & Staten (2003) are among those that
consider how information provided by credit rating agencies/bureaus  affects how markets
function.
More  recently,  papers  have looked  at the empirical  evidence  linking  the responsiveness
of governments  as  well  as  private  actors  to  better  information  provided  by the  media  (Islam
2002,  World Bank,  2002). For example,  Besley and Burgess (2001,  2002)  find that regions  in
India where the media are more active are also regions which are the least likely to suffer from
famines  during droughts. This is because  regions where the media have  a greater reach  are also
the  areas  where  voters  are  more  informed  about  political  choices  and  able  to  cast  votes
accordingly.  Political  leaders  knowing that their performance  can be monitored  and may affect
re-election  possibilities  are more  accountable  to voters.  Dyck and Zingales  (2002),  find that  a
more  active  media  as  proxied  by  a media  which  has  a  greater  circulation  can  be  a  powerful
influence  on the corporate governance environment.  The media provides information  that affects
the  reputation of corporate  managers  and  thus  their incentives  to behave  in  a certain  manner.
Shiller  (2002)  and  Herman  (2002)  discuss  how media  influence  may  in fact distort  economic
reality or provide a biased version of the "truth".
2There  is  a  tremendous  range  of  information  that  is  potentially  valuable  in  making
economic  decisions:  to give  some  examples,  it can range from simple price information,  to the
disclosure  of  govemment  processes  and  laws,  to  disclosure  of private  company  accounts.
Information is thought to be critical in affecting how a country is govemed  and how accountable
private  business  is  to  its  customers  and  shareholders.  Yet  what  information  is  produced,
disseminated,  and  analysed  depends  on the  incentives  of public  and  private agents  to do  so.
Stiglitz  (2002)  discusses  the  incentives  of governments  to  restrict  the  flow  of information.
Govemments  play a critical role  since they can restrict or facilitate  information flow.  Many of
the  institutions  (laws, regulations,  organs  of the state)  that governments  design  are  created  to
manage  the  flow  of information  in  an  economy.  For  much  of  the  information  relevant  to
decision-makers  in political and economic markets, government is in fact the sole repository (and
producer).
Djankov et.  al (2001)  demonstrate that who provides  information has a strong influence
on what  information  is transmitted.  They  show  that  media  ownership  affects  economic  and
political  outcomes  by influencing  the nature  of the information  transmitted.  Specifically,  they
focus  on  the  issue  of state  ownership  of the  media  and  the  impact  on  social  and  economic
outcomes.  Private  business  owners  will  produce,  analyse  and  disseminate  information  if it is
profitable  to do so, or if it enables them to influence public opinion in a way that increases their
non financial  gains, such  as social  stature.  Demetz  and Lehn (1985,  1988) hypothesize  that this
effect which they call the "amenity potential"  is quite high. Grossman  and Hart (1988) refer to
the non-financial benefits as the "private benefits of control".
3What  about those  that demand  information?  Consumers  and citizens  will only demand
information  if it is perceived  as useful and  will only pay for it if they cannot get it otherwise.2
Similarly  for private  business.  Countries  are  often  cited  to  have  or  not  have  a  "culture"  of
openness.  In other words citizens either do not see value in having certain kinds  of information
being  made  public  or,  put  another  way,  do  not  have  strong  enough  incentives  to  pressure
governments  or private  agents  to make  such  information  available.  Or sometimes  they  do  not
have  strong enough coalitions to support their desire for greater openness and/or the transactions
cost of forming coalitions  is too high.
This  paper  extends  the  empirical  work  on  information  and  economic  and  political
markets.  It examines how the availability of information may affect governance.  Specifically,  it
looks at (a) how the availability of basic economic data affects governance and (b) how the legal
framework  governing  access  to  information  might  affect  the  quality of governance.  I  ask,  is
better knowledge  about economic  performance  in  terms of the  timely availability  of economic
data associated with better economic and political outcomes?  Second, I examine how restrictions
on the use of information  can affect the quality of governance.  In particular,  how restrictions  on
the  media  may  affect  information  flows  and  therefore  governance.  Mass  media  provide
consumers  and  producers  with information  that they  use  to  make  decisions  in  economic  and
political markets.  The specific restriction I consider is the presence  of a Freedom of Information
Act  or  Law  (FOIA).  FOIs  determine  the  modalities  by which  citizens  or private  bodies  can
obtain information which resides with public entities.
It  is  clear  how  economic  data  helps  economic  markets  function  better.  Investors,
consumers  and  producers  can  make  better  business  decisions  by  better  assessing  market
conditions  for their products.  For example,  price and inflation  data help  determine  consumers'
2 Information being a public good  suffers from the classical problems.
4expenditure  patterns  both  between  products  and  over  time.  Why  might  we  expect  a greater
availability of economic  data to be associated with better quality government? For a number of
reasons more widely available  data can help governments  govern better. For one, the public can
judge  their governments'  ability to make  sound  policy by looking  at such data.  The ability  to
judge  leaders  according  to how  they  perform  in  the  economic  sphere  can  affect  the  level  of
support  the  government  has and  determines  how  long  they stay in  power.  In  countries  where
different  constituents  are  able  to  gauge  economic  performance,  and  where  citizens  are  well
informed,  people  are more  likely to  demand  governments  that govern  better and  governments
have  more of an incentive  to do well.  That is governments  become  more  accountable  to their
people.  Even  in  non-democratic.  countries  policymakers  may  feel  bound  to  produce  better
economic  policy  because  they  are  monitored  more  effectively  and  they  care  about  their
reputations. They will be more wary of making large mistakes.
Second, data can help better coordination between members of government. For example,
the budgetary  process  can  benefit  from data  on outcomes  related to  fiscal  expenditures.  Third,
the  use  of data  to  design  policy can  improve  policymaking,  help  identify  goals  and  evaluate
alternative  policies; and  it can help policymakers  to understand  the relative  magnitudes  of the
issues for which they may have had only a qualitative feel.  A better understanding of the effects
of policies  can  lead  to  a  change  in the  nature  of the  policies  adopted.  For these  reasons,  the
provision of timely and good quality economic data can improve governance.
Countries  which  produce  economic  data  on  a  timely  basis  and  promote  their
dissemination  are also likely to be countries which  support  better information  flows  all around.
In other words, economic  data can be thought of as a proxy for other kinds of data. It is of course
an imperfect proxy  since  experience  clearly  shows that governments  may on occasion  divulge
economic data but not political data.
5Aside  from  access  to  regular  economic  data  people  need  infornation  on a  variety  of
issues  related to  public  sector  activity.  They need  timely  information  on  decisions  related  to
various aspects of government activity, on how these decisions  will be implemented,  information
on the consequences  of these decisions  and the process  through which they are reached.  Yet in
many countries  access  to this type of information  is very limited either because of the  laws or
regulations which restrict  access,  or simply because the administrative  capacity to organize  and
disseminate information does not exist. Laws facilitating access to information held by the public
sector can play an important role in increasing information  flow and facilitating the monitoring
government. This paper examines  how the presence of Freedom  of Information (FOI) laws may
affect how countries govern. Of course, the extent to which better information  will affect choices
of course  depends on how people  can act upon their choices- many other laws affect this ability
(e.g. insult and defamation laws).  I focus on only one of the several possible relevant laws.
Data
The Transparency Index
In order to investigate the relevance of widely available  economic data for the quality of
governance,  I created  an index  which  I call  the  "transparency"  index.  I take  11  representative
variables  from  4  sectors:  the  real,  fiscal,  financial  and  external  sectors  for  a  total  of  169
6countries,  among which  145  are developing  and 24 developed,  using the World Bank definition
of developed  and developing. 3 The  11  representative  variables  are:  gross  domestic  product  (Q,
line 99b in IFS4), unemployment (Q, line 67c in IFS), the consumer price index (M, IFS line 64),
exports  (M,  line  70  in  IFS),  imports  (M,  line  71  in  IFS),  foreign  direct  investment  (Q,  line
78bed), the exchange rate (M, exchange  rate at the end of period national currency units, line ae
in IFS),  government  revenue  (Y,  IFS  line  81,  central  government  fiscal  revenue),  government
expenditure  (Y, IFS line  82, central  government fiscal expenditure),  money  supply-M2 (M, sum
of IFS  line  34  and 35)  and the  deposit  interest  rate5 (M,  IFS  line  601).  These  indicators  are
certainly  not  an  exhaustive  list  of  economic  data  that  might  be  considered  important  for
monitoring  and judging  economic  policy outcomes, but they do represent  the indicators that all
countries should have to some degree.
For each of these variables, I determined the "desirable"  frequency  level. This level was
determined by observing the actual frequency level with which the data are published in most of
the  industrialized/high  income countries  and taking  the most frequent level  as being something
that is both achievable  and desirable.  A "Q" indicates that the data is expected to be available on
a quarterly basis,  the "M" indicates  its availability on a monthly basis and a "Y" its availability
on a yearly basis. In other words GDP numbers  can be and are produced  on a quarterly basis in
some, mostly richer countries. These countries are assigned the highest score (or  a 1) in terms of
"transparency"  with respect  to  GDP  as  long  as  they  are  also  available  on  a  timely basis.  As
Table I  explains,  both  the  frequency  and the  date  for which  the  latest  data  are  available  are
counted in formulating the index.
3 Developed countries are those classified as "high income"  or having gross national income equal to or greater than
US$9,206 per capita. Countries with lower per capita income are classified as developing.
4 IFS refers to the International  Financial Statistics - a publication of the International Monetary Fund.
5 Generally this is a 3-month deposit rate.
7Table 1. Data Coding
Cut off points are based on the examining data at end-June  2002 and in mid- November 20026:
m  Q  y
1  3 months lag: 2002/7  6 months lag: 2002/3q  1 year lag: 2001
2  6 months lag: 2002/4  12 months lag: 2001/3q  1.5 year lag: 2000
3  with longer lag  with longer lag  longer lag
4  lower frequency, reasonably up to date (2002/1 q for M,  2001 for Q)
5  lower frequency, longer lag
6  not available from WDI,  IFS, or any other official websites
For example,  if I search for the  CPI data in middle November  2002, and if the data are
available for July 2002 or for more recent months,  it is assigned a score  of "1". If monthly data
are  available,  not for July or  later, but  at  least up to  April  2002,  then the  score is  "2".  If the
monthly data are only available for March 2002 or are even older, the score is "3". If the data are
reported  in  lower  frequency,  for  example,  they  are  quarterly  or  annual  and  if the  data  are
reasonably  up to  date  (for  data  such  as  the  CPI  which  are  "desired"  on a monthly  basis,  the
requirement  is  that if it is reported as  quarterly  data,  it should be  available  at least  for the  first
quarter of 2002 or if annual data, then it needs to be available at least for the year 2001), then the
score is "4". If the data are both produced at a lower frequency and is older than  required a score
of  "4", or "5" will be assigned.  If the data are not available from any of the four sources (WDI,
IFS, RMF or WB  external websites or official websites  of the countries),  a "6" is assigned.  The
scores for each country on all indicators are averaged.
For GDP data, quarterly data are "desired", if  the data are available for the first quarter of
2002 or for a more recent quarter,  the country  gets a score  of "1" on this measure.  If quarterly
6  Some additional countries  were added in November 2002; the table  is based on the observations  in November.
8data  are available but only for the third quarter of 2001  or later,  but not for the first quarter  of
2002, the score  assigned is "2". If the quarterly data are only available for the second quarter of
2001  or  are even  older; the  score  is a  "3".  If the  data  are reported  at  a  lower  frequency,  for
example,  they are annual,  then in order to get a "4", the data need to be available  for at least up
to the year 2001. Otherwise it will be assigned a "5". Again, "6" will be assigned if none of the
sources  checked have the data.
For annual  data, such as government revenue or expenditure,  if the data are  available up
to the year 2001, it is assigned a "1"; "2"  is assigned if the most recent data are for the year 2000.
Otherwise the score is "3".  Using this methodology, the United  States is assigned a value of I
for  the  consumer  price  index  because  the  CPI  for  September  2002  is  available  in  the  IFS
November  2002  edition.  Uruguay  is assigned  a value of  2 because  the most recent  CPI is  for
June 2002. And Zambia  is assigned a value of 5 because  the most recent  CPI was reported  for
1997.'
For a couple of countries the coding was not followed exactly. Two countries got a better
score  for having  higher  than  "desirable"  reporting  frequency  though  their  scores  would have
been lower since  the lag in data was longer than the optimum or desired lag. Armenia  has GDP
figures up to October 2001  and Luxembourg has FDI data up to April 2001; both are of monthly
frequency. The former could only score a "2" and the latter  a "3", by considering  the lags.  But
they receive  "1" and "2",  respectively,  since the  data are  available  at a higher  than "desired"
frequency.8
7 Note that for some of the countries the index  was prepared looking at end-June  publications.  The  index was then
broadened to cover 40 more countries, but the end-date for these is November.  This discrepancy has not made much
of a difference  since countries  that tend not to report on a timely basis  would have  the same tendency  whether one
looks at their numbers in June or in November.
8  For these two countries the cut-off point was June; they were in the first group investigated.
9I  define  "available"  by  checking  the  following  sources:  the  World  Development
Indicators  published  by the World Bank,  the Intemational  Financial  Statistics  published by the
International  Monetary  Fund  (November  2002)  and  the  internet  (official  websites  of  the
government,  such as Central  Banks,  statistical  agencies, the Ministry of Finance,  etc).  Some of
the internet sources and the WB/IMF publications are based on national publications.
In addition,  when  coding  information  from  a web  site  of the  Central  Bank  and/or  the
statistics  agency,  in cases  where there were  no actual  statistics  on the site but it was indicated
that the relevant  data were available in a publication,  the country received  a score that reflected
the most recently published issue of the printed publication.  E.g. for the end-June cut-off date, if
the web  site indicated  that there was  a report  containing  the  data published  in April,  then the
country received  a I for that data.  If the last issue available was that of January 2002, the score
was  a  2  and  so  on.  These  decisions  were  particularly  relevant  for  statistical  information
published  by  the  national  statistics  agencies  in  several  middle  income  or  rich  countries,
especially  Brazil, Cyprus, Greece and Germany.
In  cases  where  the  web  site was  inaccessible  after  two  attempts,  the  information  was
considered  as  NOT  being  available  from  this  source.  Countries  affected  include  Costa  Rica,
Guatemala,  Honduras,  and Benin. The code for each data type is then added together to create an
index  of  transparency  in  economic  activities  and  they  are  averaged.  The  best  score  for
"transparency"  is thus 1, and the worst possible is 6 (if a country scores 6 on all 11  indicators).
It is important to note two things: even if the internet site is accessible,  many individuals
with interest in the data  may not have easy access  or any access  to the internet.  In cases where
there are national publications,  interested people may not be able to purchase  it in a bookstore or
the  cost  may  be  exorbitantly  high.  A  mitigating  factor  may  be  that  as  long  as  some  key
10individuals or organizations  (such as researchers, and the media) have access to this information,
there is some  chance  that others  who are interested  in key  variables  will  be able to obtain  the
necessary  information.  Despite  this  fact,  the measure  of availability  used in  this paper  almost
surely  overstates  how  much  information  on  common  economic  data  is  easily  available  in
practice.
The index, thus constructed  is used to assess the importance of information/transparency
on institutional quality or governance.  It is likely that countries that produce timely data on these
indicators are more likely, on average, to produce more timely economic data of other kinds.
The  transparency  index  indicates  how  much  information  governments  are  willing  to
disclose - but the FOI law gives access to more than just economic data.
A)  Access to Information Index
Even when governments publish simple economic  data, the people they govern may not
have  sufficient information  to judge outcomes and monitor performance.  Information  on a wide
variety of activities that is not immediately encapsulated  in the type of economic data discussed
above,  can  be  very important  in  ensuring  accountability  of government.  Information  on how
decisions  are made,  as  well as  the immediate  inputs into,  and outcomes  of,  these decisions  are
critical  for monitoring purposes. A  key question is how does  society get  information  on what it
wants and needs to know about its government?  In many countries  there  are clear rules or laws
which define the rights of individuals and private entities  - often defined in general  terms in the
constitution  and defined  in more detail  in Freedom  of Information  (FOI)  laws. The adoption  of
FOI laws is quite recent in the case of most countries.  As citizens around the world have become
progressively more aware of their rights and have learned the value of adopting such laws from
their neighbours,  they have  adopted FOIs. FOI laws  may vary in both content  and scope  from
11country to country.  Some laws are very detailed regarding what information  may be kept secret
and under what circumstances  and some are quite general.9
Regulations  and  laws  governing  access  to  information  and  the  ability  of people  to
disseminate  information  freely may be  covered in other related  laws  as well.  Press  and media
laws may determrine  how much information  is circulated.  Restrictive practices  such as requiring
journalists or newspapers  to be licensed  by the state may limit the flow of information,  either by
restricting entry or by inducing media personnel  to censor information  dissemination  for fear of
reprisal from government.  These  restrictions also  vary in kind  and scope between countries.  In
Austria  there  is  no  requirement  on journalists  or newspapers  to  be  licensed.' 0 In  the  Czech
Republic journalists  are not required to be licensed or accredited but newspapers  are required to
be  licensed.  However,  an  amended  Press  Law  in  1990  has  changed  the  former  licensing
requirements  of any  publishing  activity  into  a  simple  registration.  All  periodical  press  is
registered with the Ministry of Culture."
In Ethiopia, journalists are not required to be licensed or accredited; however, newspaper
licenses  are issued by the Ministry of Information  and  Culture  and  are  annual, being renewed
upon  payrnent  of the  prescribed  annual  fee.  12 There  is  a fee  of US  $1,185  for renewal  of a
license;  and prospective  and existing newspapers  are required to maintain bank balances of US
$1250 as a bond against potential offenses that journalists might commit. Publications that fail to
demonstrate  at  least this degree  of solvency  whenever required by the Ministry of Information
9 See Martin and Feldman (2003), Transparency International website.
10  (http://www.austriaemb.org.au/media.htm  and www.hrcr.orp./safrica/expression/telesystem  austria.htmnl.
" Law #81/1966 ("On periodical printings" regulates the publications of the press and other mass media.
12 Proclamation 34/1992, Art. 7). According to the website  ijnet.org/Archive/2001/8/17-10268.html,  an editor of the
sports newspaper Kicker, failed to renew its-  license and was sentenced to one month in prison.
12and Culture may have their licenses revoked.13 The fee, compared  to Ethiopia's per capita GDP
is high- GDP per capita being $122.1  in 2001.'4
The  purpose of all  such laws  is to  define  a  framework  for the sharing  of information.
Sometimes just the act of adopting  a law  can signify a reduction  in the restrictions  imposed on
information  flow.  Sometimes the adoption of a law can make people more aware of the value of
information  (Chongkittavom,  2002).  Such  laws  are  one  important  element  in  the  whole
institutional environment affecting information flow.
Adopting a FOI is clearly not enough to ensure that it is effective.  Government agencies
must be required to publish information  and there must be some implementating  mechanism  for
the  FOI.  For example,  in  some  countries  a  central  commission  is  charged with  ensuring  that
information  gets out to the public as in the case of the Information  Commission in Ireland, the
Data  Protection  Inspectorate  in  Estonia  and  the  Office  of the  Official  Information  Board  in
Thailand,15 while in Georgia, Bulgaria and Finland this is not the case. Countries vary greatly in
the  time  it  takes  to  satisfy  requests  for  information.  In  Estonia,  Hong  Kong,  China,  and
Hungary,  the laws specify, that responses to requests must be made before or by the  15th day. In
South Africa, the  limit specified is 30  days and in Thailand  the limit is not specified  though  it
must be within a "reasonable period".
In  case  requests  for information  are  denied,  in  most  cases,  the  nature  of the  appeals
process  is also specified.  Generally, the courts are responsible for oversight:  in Canada the final
appeal  goes to the Federal court.  In Ireland there is a review by an Information  Commissioner
33 www.cpj .org/attacksO0/africaOO/Ethiopia.html  and www.cpj .org/protests/Olltrs/Ethiopia3I OctOlpl.html
'4 World Bank data.
15 Various sources:  I)Information Commissioner in Ireland - Freedom of Information Act 1997, Part IV, article 33;
obtained from: www.humanrightsinitiative.org  2) Data Protection Inspectorate in Estonia - Public Information Act,
RTI 2000, 92, 597, Chapter VI, article 44; obtained from: L1NET  3) Office of the Official Information Board -
Official Information Act, B.E. 2540  1997,  Section 6; obtained from: www.humanrightsinitiative.org);
13and  then  an  Appeal  to  the  High  Court.  In  Thailand,  appeals  are  made  to  the  Information
Disclosure  Tribunal,  and  in  Hong  Kong,  China,  to  the  Ombudsman.  It is  clear  that  several
institutional features need to be developed to ensure there is effective implementation of FOIs. A
survey by the  Bulgarian Access to Information Programme  Foundation in 2000,  found that one
year after the country adopted a freedom of information  law, only: 42% of the Bulgarian public
administration  had  implemented  it  effectively.  A  study  by the  Romanian  Academic  Society
showed  that  while  "while  68  percent  of Romanian  institutions  had  an  office  in  charge  of
informing  citizens about what they do, only  16 percent had the required list of data informing the
public." (Reuters,  Dec  17).16 Despite these caveats,  however,  it is possible to say that a country
with an FOI law is more likely to be more open having taken  an important step towards  allowing
better information  flows from the public sector to the private sector.
Not only are FOI laws a relatively recent  phenomenon on the scene  (see Table  2)  with
only 50 countries  having adopted one as of May 2002  and 54 as of end 2002, but many countries
are still trying to work out how to implement them effectively. Precisely because the adoption of
such laws is relatively recent,  it some countries it might be difficult to argue that they have had a
substantial  effect on governance.  Yet, even in these cases it might be  argued that adoption  of a
FOI  act may be taken  as  one of the  acts a government takes in an ongoing process to improve
transparency:  it is rarely  the  first act.  Thus  the  existence  of an  act may be an  indicator  for  a
general move towards ensuring greater access to information.
i-I  B)  Other Data
I use two sets  of governance/or  institutional quality indicators to study the relationship  between
transparency, and  governance.  The  first  set  is  developed  by  (Kaufmann,  Kraay  and  Zoido-
Lobodan, KKZ,  1999). The second set is composed of the ICRG indicators.  The KKZ indicators
16 This is taken from an article by Antonia Oprita "Romania must shape up laws to get into EU'"
14are taken  from the years  1997-98.  The ICRG  indicators used span  several  years from  1984 to
1997.  The  former  indicators  measure  aspects  of  govemance  such  as:  graft,  government
effectiveness, regulatory burden, the rule of law, political instability and violence, and voice  and
accountability.  The latter  indicators  measure  corruption,  the  extent to  which  the rule of law  is
respected, bureaucratic  quality, contract repudiation and expropriation risk.
Other  variables  used  in this paper are:  an indicator  for the freedom  of the press,  1999,
from  Freedom House which ranges between  1 and 100,  a variable  indicating the extent of state
ownership  of the  press  (poss)  and  television  (toss)  both  taken  from  Djankov  et  al  (2001),
newspaper  circulation  (circu)  defined  as  circulation  per  1000  people,  1996 - from  the  United
Nations  Educational,  Scientific,  and  Cultural  Organisation,  Statistical  Yearbook.  All  three  of
these variables have been shown to be associated  with institutional quality (Djankov et al, 2001,
Besley,  Burgess and Pratt, 2002 ).  The GNP per capita figures are an average of the years  1992-
96  in  the  regressions  with  the  KKZ variables  and  1979-83  for the  ICRG  measures.  They  are
taken  from  the  World  Development  Indicators,  2000,  World  Bank.  Many  of the  regressions
control  for the legal origin of the  country - whether  English, French,  Scandinavian  or German.
How long a country has  been in existence  as an independent nation can be expected to have an
effect  on institutional  quality  since institutions  develop  slowly  over time. This variable  is  aiso
used  to  assess  the  robustness  of the  transparency  variable.  Finally,  a  dummy  variable  which
distinguishes between countries that have a FOI law and those that do not is used as a controlling
variable.  This indicator  is  composed  from  data  held by  Article  19 of International  Center and
Censorship, (ICC,1993)  and World Bank research and shown in Table 2.17
17  Author's compilation.
15Table 2. Countries with FOIA
Country  Year of  Name of the Law
Introduction
Albania  1999  Law on the right of information over official documents
Argentina  1998  FOI law
Australia  1982  FOIA
Austria  1986  Obligation to Infonnation  law -it is not FOIA
Belgium  1991-2001  series of laws and decrees
Belize  1994.  FOIA
Bosnia-Herzegovina  2001  FOIA
Bulgaria  2000  Access  to Information Act
Canada  1983  Access to Information Act
Chile  1999  Law on Administrative Documents
Colombia  1888,  1985
Czech Republic  1999  Law on free access  to information
Denmark  1985  The Public Information  Law
EU  2001  Regulation regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Conmission documents
Estonia  2000  Public Information Act
Finland  1951,  1999  Act on the Openness of  Government Activities
France  1978  Freedom of access to the administrative documents
Georgia  Freedom of Information (chapter 3)
Ghana  1999  Right to Information  Bill
Greece  1986,1999  Administrative Proceedings Code
Hong Kong  1995  Code on Access to Information
Hungary  1992  Data Protection Law
Kyrgyz R  2001  Law on the Guarntees and Freedom of Access to InfoTmation
Iceland  1996  Information Act
Ireland  1997  Freedom of Info_mtion Act
Israel  1998  Freedom of Infomaton Law (5758-1998)
Japan  1999  Law concerning the Disclosur  of Information held by alministive organs
Latvia  1998  -_  Freedom of Information Law
Lithuania  1996  Lawon Provision of  Ionfoation to the_Public
Mexico  2002  Fredom of Infom-tion Act
Moldova  2000  Law on Access to Information
Netherlands  1991  Law on Official  Information
NewZealand  1982  Official Informaton Act
Nigeria  1999  Freedom of  Information  Bill
Norway  1971  Freedom of Information Act
Panama  2002  Law on Free Access to Public Records
Poland  2001  Freedom of Information Act
Portuga  1993  Law on Access to Administrative Docunments
Romania  2001  Law regarding  the free access to the information of the publc interest
Russian Federation  1995  Law on Infinrmation, Infromatization  and Protection of Information; Law on State Secrets
Slovalda  2000  Act on free aocess to information
South Africa  2000  Promotion of Access to information act
South Korea  1996  Act on Disclosure of Information by Public Agencies
Spain  1992  Legal regime of  the public administrations and the comnaon administrative  procedure
Sweden  1766.  Freedom of  the Press Act
Thailand  1997  Official Infonrmation AMt
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3  shows the transparency index for selected countries.  Aggregating  and averaging
the transparency  indicator  among countries  of different income levels  shows that rich countries
are more  than  twice  as  "transparent"  (Table  4).  What  is  interesting though  is  that some  high
16income countries, half of which are oil producers, have very low transparency ratings.  These are
the United  Arab Emirates,  Qatar,  Kuwait, New Caledonia,  Brunei,  the Bahamas,  and  Slovenia.
The variation among high income  countries  is the highest among the three groups.  For the low
income  countries not only  is the average  transparency lower but the variation between countries
is also smaller.
Table 3. Transparency Indicator for Selected  Countries
Country  Transparency  Country  Transparency  Country  Transparency
Afghanistan  6  France  I  New Zealand  1.36
AIbania  2.18  Gabon  4.09  Nigeria  3.91
Algeria  2.45  Georgia  3.18  Norway  1
Angola  3.45  Germany  I  Oman  1.6
Argentina  1.36  Ghana  3.82  Pakistan  2.64
Armenia  2  G reece  1.45  Panama  1.91
Australia  1  1  Guatemala  2.27  Paraguay  3.82
Austria  1  Guinea  4.36  Peru  1
Bahamas,  The  2.45  Guyana  3.09  Philippines  1.18
Bahrain  2.55  Haiti  2.45  Portugal  1
Bangladesh  3  Honduras  2.64  Qatar  3.09
Barbados  1.64  Hong Kong, China,  1  Romania  1.09
Belgium  1.27  Hungary  1  Russian Federation  1
Belize  2.82  Iceland  1.36  Rwanda  2.73
Benin  3.91  India  1.91  Saudi Arabia  2.64
Bolivia  2.09  Indonesia  2.82  Senegal  4
Bosnia and Herzegovina  3.45  Iran,  Islamic Rep.  3  Sierra Leone  3.09
Botswana-  2.82  Iraq  5.27  Singapore  I
Brazil  1  Israel  1.36  Slovenia  3.09
Brunei  5.91  Italy  I_Somalia  5.91
Bulgaria  1.45  Jamaica  2.73  South Africa  1.09
Cambodia  2.73  Japan  ._  Spain  1
Cameroon  3.73  Kazakhstan  1.18  Sri Lanka  2.36
Canada  1  Kenya  . 2.64  Suriname  3.45
Cape Verde  3.55  Korea, Dem.  Rep.  6  Swaziland  2.55
Central African  Republic  4.27  Korea, Rep.  __Sweden  1.09
Chad  2.73  Kuwait  2.73  Switzerland  I
Chile  I  Latvia  1  aiikistan  4.91
China  2.45  Lebanon  2.7  Tanzania  2.73
Colombia  1  Lesotho  3.18  Thailand  I
Congo, Rep.  4.82  Liberia  3.3  Trinidad and Tobago  5.55
Costa  Rica  2.09  Libya  2.86  Tunisia  1.55
Cote d'lvoire  3  Lithuania  1.55  Turkey  I
Croatia  1.09  Madagascar  3.73  Uganda  2.73
Cuba  5.36  Malawi  3  United  Arab Emirates  2.09
Cyprus  1  Malaysia  1  United  Kingdom  1
Denmark  1  Malta  1.91  United States  1
Djibouti  3.45  Mauritania  4  Uzbekistan  5.3
Dominica  4  Mexico  1.18  Vanuatu_L  4
Ecuador  *  1.18  Mongolia  3.18  enezuela, RB  2.36
Egypt,  Arab Rep.  2.73  Mozambique  4.18  Vietnam  3.27
Equatorial Guinea  3.64  Namibia  3.36  Yemen,  Rep.  2.27
Estonia  1  Nepal  2.82  Yugoslavia,  Fed. Rep.  1.64
Fiji  3.45  Netherlands  1.18  Zambia  3.91
Finland  1  New Caledonia  5.09  Zmbabwe  3.64
17Table 4. Descriptive Statistics: Transparency Relative to Income Levels
Income Level  Number of Countries  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
Low  59  3.44  1.04  1.73  6
Middle  77  2.26  1.13  1  5.55
High  34  1.6  1.17  1  5.91
High (only North Amer ica and European)  27  1.11  0.2  1  1  .81
As Table  5 shows,  high  income  countries  are -much more  likely to have FOI  laws but
many still do not have them  (just under  50%). Among the low income countries, countries such
as Moldova and the Kyrgyz Republic have a FOI law but neither India nor Bangladesh does.  Yet
on  freedom  of the  press  ratings,  Freedom  house  rates  India  and  Bangladesh  higher than  the
Kyrgyz  Republic.  The freedom  of the press rating  for India,  Bangladesh,  and the  Kyrgyz  Rep
are:  63,  41,  and 36, respectively.  The difference  is probably due to two facts:  first information
can be "free" without the FOI,  and second the press can be free but not have access to reliable
information.  Moreover,  the  FOI  act  has relevance  for  other  actors  beside  the  press:  business
interests for example.
Table 5. FOIA Distribution in High-Middle-Low  Income Countries
Income  Obs  Percentage  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
Low  61  11%  0.32  0  1
Middle  85  23%  0.42  0  1
IHigh  34  56%  0.5  0  1
The correlation between transparency  and other freedom of media (information)  variables
are quite high  and significant  as  might be  expected.  Djankov  et al (2001)  have shown  that  in
countries  where  state  ownership  of the  media  is high,  the  press is less  free.  The  transparency
18indicator  constructed  in this paper  is significantly  correlated with variables  that have been used
in the literature to indicate how freely information flows in an economy,  particularly information
provided  by  the  media.  Table  6  below  shows  that countries  in  which  transparency  is  lower,
freedom  of the press is lower, state ownership of the press  also tends to be higher,  there is less
chance  of finding  a  freedom of informnation  law and television  also  tends  to  be dominated  by
government.
Table 6. Correlation of the Freedom of Media Variables
State
Freedom  State Ownership  Ownership
of Press  FOI  Circulation  of Press  Transparency  of TV
Freedom of Press  1
FOI  0.3720***  1  .
Circulation  0.5600***  0.4533***  1
State Ownership of Press  -0.6486***  -0.4946***  -0.6117***  1
Transparency  -0.5338***  -0.4089***  -0.64***  0.6424***  1
State Ownership  of TV  -0.4833 ***  -0.4295***  -0.43***  0.8914***  0.4777***  1.0000
Note: three asterisks means the correlation is significant  at 0.01 level..
A graphical  representation of the transparency  index with the governance indicators  tells
an interesting  story. Figures  1-6 shows the index plotted against three of the KKZ indicators and
3 of the ICRG indicators.
Figure 1. Transparency Index and Government effectiveness  (KKZ)
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19Figure 2. Transparency Index and Regulatory burden (KKZ)
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Figure 3. Transparency Index and Graft (KKZ)
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Figure 4. Transparency  Index and Corruption (ICRG)
6.0125  800  8  o  0~0  o  0  0
000
000
-1.5668  0  0
6.015  - 00  8  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0
00  0
0  00  0  0
0  0  8  o  0 
CD  0  0  0  0  0  0
00  o  0
0 0  0  0  0 E~~~0  3  . 0  0
00  00  000
0~~~~~
0  0  0  0  0
0
.68125  0  0
transparency
20Figure 5. Transparency Index and  Rule of Law Index (ICRG)
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Figure 6. Transparency  Index and  Contract repudiation risk (ICRG)
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Each  of  the  scatter  plots  indicate  a  negative  association  between  the  index  and
governance  indicators.  Bar graphs  looking at governance  indicators  and access  to information
tell a similar story as shown in Figures 7-10.
21Figure 7. Average Government Effectiveness In
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22Figure  10, Average  Rule of Law in Countries
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Regression  Results
Tables 7a-b  shows the most parsimonious  specification of a regression of transparency on
institutional  quality.  It  shows  that  controlling  for  GDP  per  capita,  the transparency  index  is
strongly  correlated  with  governance  (many  at  the  1%  confidence  level).  More  transparent
governments  govern  better  for  a  wide  number  of governance  indicators  such  as  government
effectiveness,  regulatory burden, corruption (both KKZ and ICRG),  voice and accountability, the
rule  of law,  bureaucratic  efficiency,  contract  repudiation,  expropriation  risk  and  a  composite
ICRG  index.
This result holds  also when a subset of countries  in the sample - that composed  of over
100 developing  countries  is considered  as shown in Tables  8a-b.
Table 7a. Transparency and Governance
DATA SET: KA UFMANN,  KRAA YAND  ZOIDO-L  OBA TON
How authorities are selected and  Capacity of the state  to  Respect  of the state and
r laced  implement sound policies  the citizens  for the rules
Voice  and  Political Instability  Government  Regulatory  Rule of  Graift
Accountability  and Violence  Effectiveness  Burden  Law
Income per capita  *39***  *55***  .4**  .30***  .63***  .54***
_____________  (5.11)  (8.44)  (802  (6.13)  (11.49)  (8.7)
Transparency  -.17**  -. 06  ..14*  ~  .14***  -. 04  .
_______________(-2.14)  (-1.16)  (-.9  (-2.74)  (-.76)  (-1.85
Constan t  -2.71  *e  -. 444***  -3.4***  .l.99***  -5.08***  -4.26**
_______________  (-3.48)  .(-6.84)  (-6.2)  (-3.95)  (-9.41)  (-.2
#obs  . 136  125  126  131  131  125
____  R___  __  .42  .52  .55  .45  .64  .57
23Table 7b. Transparency and Governance
DATA SET: ICRG, Averaged over the period 1984-1997
ICRG  Corruption  Rule of  Bureaucracy  Contract  Expropriation
Law  Quality  Repudiation  Risk
Income per capita  . *59***  .59***  .84***  .75***  .56***  .48***
(4.6)  (3.63)  (5.4)  (4.58)  (4.45)  (4.58)
Transparency  -.50***  -. 56***  -. 50***  -.55***  -. 46***  -. 430"
(-6.39)  (-5.49)  (4.56)  (-5.31)  (-5.35)  (-5.92)
Constant  .39  .10  -1.8  -1.03  .79  1.68*
(.36)  (.07)  (-1.35)  (-.75)  (.73)  (1.85)
#obs  94  94  94  94  94.  94
R__ _  .59  .47  .54  .50  .57  .58
*indicates significance at. I level,  **  at .05 level and *** at .01 level.
Table 8a. Transparency and Governance in Non-OECD Countries
DA TA  SET: KA UFMANN,  KRAA Y  AND ZOIDO-LOBA TON
How authorities are selected and  Capacity of the state to  Respect of the state and the
replaced  implement sol nd policies  citizens  for the rules
Voice and  Political Instability  Government  Regulatory  Rule of  Graft
Accountability  and Violence  Effectiveness  Burden  Law
Income per capita  .22***  .45***  .30***  .27***  .51 **  .35***
(1)  (2.69)  (5.61)  (4.91)  (4.61)  (8.12)  (5.62)
Transparency  -.12*  -. 03  -. 09*  -.13**  -.001  -. 05
(-1.74)  (-.59)  (-1.77)  (.02)  (-.02)  (-1.  1)
Constant  i1.57**  -3.76***  -2.44***  -I.79***  -4.29  -2.93**
(-2.01)  (-5.09)  (4.45)  (-3.27)  (-7.51)  (-5.45)
#obs  113  102  103  108  108  102
R__ _  .18  .33  .31  .30  .45  .34
Table 8b. Transparency and Governance in Non-OECD  Countries
DATA SET: ICRG, Averaged over the period  1984-1997
ICRG  Corrupti6n  Rule of Law  Bureaucracy  Contract  Expropriation
Quality  Repudiation  Risk
Income per capita  .27***  .19  .43***  .32**  .32***  .26**
(2.83)  (1.48)  (3.68)  (2.58)  (2.84)  (2.79)
Transparency  -.32***  -. 35***  -. 26**  -. 32***  -.32***  -.29***
(4.46)  (-3.8)  (-2.4)  (-3.24)  (-3.75)  (4.14)
Constant  2.13$*  2.32**  .36  1.36  2.01**  2.82***
(2.69)  (2.30)  (.36)  (1.34)  (2.15)  (3.56)
#obs  72  72  72  72  72  72
.34  .19  .24  .21  .32  .32
Table 9 shows the significance of the index after controlling for legal  origin. Using table
9 as the standard set  of regressions,  several variations  are run by adding different variables  one
at  a  time  to  check  for  the  stability  of the  significance  of the  transparency  index.  The  index
24remains  significant  for  most  of the  indicators  above  and  often  at the  1%  level  for  all  these
permutations.;
Table 9a. Transparency and Legal  Origin Terms
DATA  SET: KAUFMANN,  KRAYANDZOIDO-LOBATON
How authorities  are selected and  Capacity of the state to  Respect of the state and the
repl  lced  - implement sound policies  citizens for the rules
Voice and  Political Instability  Government  Regulatory  Rule of Law  Graft
Accountability  and Violence  Effectiveness  Burden
Socialist Legal Code  -.31  -.06  .- 62***  -. 67***  -.51***  -. 80**
(-1.77)  (-.32)  (-4.28)  (-4.3)  (-3.57)  (-5.91)
French Legal  Code  -. 02  -;13  -.10  -. 11  -.29**  -. 35***
(-.14)  ' (-.91)  (-.84)  (-1.18)  (-2.74)  (-317
German Legal Code  .29  .24  .20  -. 31**  .29  -.11
(-1.51)  (1.  10)  (.84)  (-2.27)  (1.65)  (-.38)
Scandinavian Legal  Code  .65**  49**  .62**  -.07  .48***  79***
(4.1)  _(3.53)  (4 93)  (-.63)  (4.08)  (4.82)
Income  .34**  .51***  40***  .25***  54***  44***
(4.22)  (7.05)  (6.73)  (4.94)  (10.18)  (7.65)
Transparency  Ig**  -.06  -.17***  -20***  -.06  -.16***
(-2.371  (-.98)  (-3.23)  (4.1)  *  (-1.38)  (-30
Constant  -2.16**  -4.06***  -2.79***  -1.34**  4.14*0*  -3.03***
,~(-2.77)  (-5.45)  (-4.75)  (-2.51)  (-7.71)  (-5.51)
#obs  136  125  126  131  131  125
=R  .46  .55  .63  .55  .69  .69
Table 9b. Transparency and Legal Origin Terms
DATA SET: ICRG, Averaged over the period  1984-1997
ICRG  Corruption  Rule of Law  Bureaucmcy  Contract  Expropriation
Quality  Repudiation  Risk
SocialistLegal Code  .44  .73  1.16**  .01  .32  68e
(1.63)  (2.57)  (5.27)  (.06)  (.92)  (2.64)
French Legal Code  -.40**  -. 20  -.31  -.73***  -. 28*  -.38***
(-2.53)  (-.92)  (-1.43)  (-3.31)  (-1.82)  (-2.81)
Germian Legal Code  .67**  .51  .86**  75***  .92**  54***
(3.7)  (1.43)  (2.43)  (2.8)  (6.17)  (4.3)
Scandinavian  Legal Code  840**  1.47e*  1.17***  .88***  59**  39**
(4.  12)  (5.32)  (4.49)  (2.98)  (3.1)  (2.65)
Income  .53"  51**  78***  .66***  .525*  45*5*
(4.2)  (3.17)  (5.20)  (4.02)  (4.12)  (4.51)
Transparency  -. 42***  -.47***  -. 39***  -46**  -.39***  -.37*0
(-6.04)  (4.85)  (-3.82)  (4.77)  (-4.88)  (-5.57)
Constant  .81  .53  -1.54  -. 24  1.02  1.89*
(.81)  (.41)  (-1.25)  (-19)  (1.01)  (2.29)
# obs  94  94  94  94  94  94
R  .68  .54  .62  .61  .65  .67
*indicates signifcance at. I level, **  at .05 level and 55 5at .01 level.
Controlling  for various  regional  dummies  (such  as  Africa,  the  Middle  East  and North
Africa,  East  Asia,  South  Asia  or  Eastern  Europe)  does  not  alter  these  results  significantly.
Adding  years since independence  as an additional  variable in the specifications  (does reduce the
25significance  of the transparency  index somewhat  in some of the  cases but generally the results
stay the same: the transparency  index is significantly correlated with governance indicators.
Others have found  that state ownership of the media is associated with  poorer economic
and social outcomes.  I use an index developed  by Djankov et al (2001)  and World Bank (2002),
to  see  whether the transparency  index  is still significant once this index  is added (not shown).
However,  the data on: ownership of the media is only available for a much smaller sample.  I find
that.addition of state ownership of the media to the right hand side of the regressions reduces the
impact of the transparency  index in some of the regressions (some of the -versions using the KKZ
indicators) but the  general  conclusions  are still valid. That is, even in countries where much of
information  packaging  and dissemination  to the  general  public  is controlled  by government,  a
government that publishes more economic information governs better on average.
The  transparency  index  is  significant  at  the  10%  level  even  after  controlling  for
newspaper circulation,  freedom  of the press and the presence  of a Freedom of Information  law
(see Tables  lOa-lOf).
Table  lOa. Transparency and Freedom of Press
DATA  SET: KAUFmANN,  KRAAYANDZOIDO-LOBA TON
How authorities are selected and  Capacity of the state  to  Respect of the state and
rep  wced  i*n.knwnt  d Dolicies  the citizens for the rules
Voice and  PoCitical lstability  Govemnment  Regulatory  Rule of  Graft
._______________  Accountability  and Vioknce  Effectiveness  Burden  LAW 
Socialist Legal Code  -. 03  .08  -.51***  -. 55***  -. 40***  -. 68**
___________________  _  . 2  (-.3S).  .47)  (-3.51)  (4.15)  (-3.15)  (-5.17)
French Legal Code  -. 04  -. 12  -. 08  -.09  ..28**  -. 34***
.________  . (-.61)  (-.92)  (-.76)  (-1.11)  (-2.71)  (-3.19)
Gcmian Legal Code  -. 06  .09  .10  -. 41***  .21  -. 22
.___  ~(-.70)  . (.50)  (.48)  (-3.22)  (1.29)  (-.83)
Scandinavian Legal  Code  .05  .23  .45***  - -. 25  .32*  - .59.*
(.66)  (1.53)  (3.5)  (-2.19)**  (2.52)  (3.58)
Income  .13***  .41*0*  .33*0*  .18***  .48***  .360*0
(3.87)  (5.19)  (5.94)  (4.06)  (8.55)  (6.88)
Transparency  .030*  .01  -.12**  -.14***  -.009  -.09
(21.9)  (.80)  (-2.24)  (-3.09)  (-.20)  (-2.14)
Freedom of  press (reverse)  .03***  .01***  .01***  .01***  .009***  .01***
(21.9)  (418)  (3.72)  (5.16)  (3.61)  (4.40)
Constant  -2.57*.*  -4.2*0*  -2.94***  -1.49*0*  -4.27***  -3.19*0*
(-8.1)  (-5.82)  1  (-5.45)  (-3.37)'  (-8.24)  (-6.52)
#obs  135  124  125  130  130  124
.____________________  _  R.89  .62  .67  .63  .72  .74
26Table 10b. Transparency and Freedom of Press
DATA SET: ICRG, Averaged over the period 1984-1997
ICRG  Corruption  Rule of Law  Bureaucracy  Contract  Expropriation
Quality  Repudiation  Risk
Socialist Legal Code  .65  .98**  1.45***  .21  .55  85**
(1.45)  (.48)  (1.02)  (2.07)
French Legal Code  -.34**  -.12  -.23  -.69***  -.22  -.34*
(-2.35)  (-.58)  (-1.10)  (-3.24)  (.1.55)  (-2.75)
German Legal Code  .50**  .35  .65*  *54**  *75***  38***
(2.94)  (.98)  (1.89)  (2.10)  (5.39)  (3.04)
Scandinavian  Legal  Code  *59***  1.23***  .87***  .60**  *35**  .17
(3.25)  (4.22)  (3.39)  (2.12)  (2.57)  (1.31)
Income  .46***  43***  .68***  .58***  44***  39***
(4.68)  (3.17)  (5.92)  (4.16)  (4.73)  (4.93)
Transparency  -. 31***  -.35***  -.25**  -.36***  -.27***  -. 28***
(-5.12)  (-3.33)  (-2.54)  (-3.83)  (-3.87)  (506)
Freedom of press (reverse)  .01**  .02***  .02**  .02***  .02***  01***
(3.59)  (2.78)  (3.59)  (2.68)  (3.8)  (3.79)
Constant  .28  -.07  -2.24**  .76  .46  1.46**
(.39)  (-.06)  (-2.32)  (-.72)  (.66)  (2.34)
#obs  93  93  93  93  93  93
R
2. .73  .59  .68  64  .72  .72
*indicates  signif  cance at.I level,  at .05 level and *  at .01 level.
Table 10c. Transparency  and Circulation
DATA SET: K4 UFMANN,  KRAA YAND ZOiDO-LOBA TON
How authorities  are selected and  Capacity of the state to  Respect of the state and
_  replaced  implement sound policies  the citizens for the rules
Voice and  Political Instability  Government  Regulatory  Rule of  Graft
Accountability  and Violence  Effectiveness  Burden  Law
SociaGst Legal Code  -. 32  -. 05  -.73***  -.81***  -. 60***  -.80***
(-1.54)  (-.27)  (-3.85)  (4.52)  (-3.5)  (4.60)
French Legal Code  -.13  -.20  -. 25*  -. 08  -. 39***  -.46***
(-.80)  (-1.35)  (-1.88)  (-.86)  (-3.13)  (-3.51)
German  Legal Code  .30  .25  .04  -. 46**  37*  -. 09
(1.38)  (.88)  (.14)  (-2.31)  (1.9)  (-.27)
Scandinavian  Legal Code  *57***  *53***  .55***  - 10  .51***  76***
(3.07)  (3  47)  (3.52)  (-.88)  (3.92)  (3.97)
Income  .24  .34***  35***  -. 01  .48***  49***
(1.65)  (3.00)  (3.10)  (-419)  (511  4.15)
Transparency  -.15  -. 05  -. 21**  -.12*  -.04  -.18**
(-1.50)  (-67)  (-241)  (-1.98)  (-.79)  (-2.4)
Circulation (reverse)  .12  .09  .02  .25***  .03  -. 03
(1.32)  (1.23)  (.30)  (4.21)  (.44)  (-.52)
Constant  -1.89*  -3.02***  -2.36***  -.16  -3.69***  -3.22***
(-1.69)  (-3.30)  (-2.68)  (-.21)  (-5.13)  (-3.69)
# obs  ~~~~102  101  101  12  102  101
R  .48  50  62  56  66  69
27Table 10d. Transparency and Circulation
DATA SET: ICRG, Averaged over the period 1984-1997
ICRG  Corruption  Rule of Law  Bureaucracy  Contract  Expropriation
Quality  Repudiation  Risk
Socialist Legal Code  .32  .65**  1.13***  .03  .10  .50**
(1.24)  (2.1)  (4.44)  (.10)  (.37)  (2.27)
French Legal Code  -.55***  -.47**  -.41*  -. 94***  -. 34**  -.45**
(-3.35)  (-2.05)  (-1.69)  (4.01)  (-2.14)  (-.34)
German Legal Code  .60**  .54  .77*  .90***  .66***  .34**
(2.55)  (1.31)  (1.75)  (2.86)  (3.76)  (2.06)
Scandinavian Legal Code  .77***  1.39***  1.18***  .89***  .49**  .30*
(3.49)  (4.72)  (4.03)  (2.65)  (2.61)  (1.97)
Income  .48**  .59**  .74***  .79***  .26  .28**
(2.5)  (2.39)  (3.21)  (3.02)  (1.53)  (201)
Transparency  -. 42***  -. 53***  -. 38***  -.57***  -.27***  -.30***
(-5.94)  (-5.35)  (-2.93)  (-5.68)  (-3.16)  (4.21)
Circulation  (reverse)  .02  -.10  .02  -. 18  .23**  .13
.__________  _  (.16)  (-.61)  (.13)  (-1.22)  (2.05)  (1.48)
Constant  1.21  .58  -1.36  -.16  1.80**  2.57***
(1.08)  (.41)  (-1.00)  (-.11)  (1.76)  (2.97)
#obs  82  82  82  82  82  82
Ra  .68  .57  .59  .62  .66  .66
*indicates  significance  at.  Ilevel,  **  at.05 level and *** at.01 level.
Table 10e.  Transparency and FOIA
DA TA SET: KAUFMANN,  KRAA YAND ZoIDO-LOBA TON
How authorities are selected and  Capacity of the state to  Respect of the state  and the
replaced  implement sound policies  citizens for the rules
Voice and  Political  Instability  Govemnment  Regulatory  Rule of Law  Graft
Accountability  and Violence  Effectiveness  Burden
Socialist Legal Code  -.40**  -.07  -.68***  -.71***  -.52***  -.85***
(-2.45)  (--41  (-.6  (.4.49)  (-3.58)  (-6.17)
French Legal Code  .02  -. 11  -.08  -.08  -.27**  -.33***
(.14)  (-.80)  (-.92)  (-2.57)  (-2.91)
German Legal Code  .45  .27  .17  -.35*  .42**  -. 02
(1.63)  (I .0  1)  (.51)  (-1.8)  (2.19)  (-.04)
Scandinavian  Legal  Code  .54***  .50***  .57***  -.10  .48***  .73***
(3.09)  (3.62)  (4.31)  (-.89)  (3.92)  (5.05)
Income  .31*.  .46***  .37***  .23***  .52***  .44**
(3.7)  (5.91)  (5.29)  (3.88)  (8.28)  (6.34)
Transparency  -. 09  -.10  -.15**  .18***  -.07  .11**
(-1.37)  (-1.47)  (-2.39)  (-3.09)  (-1.38)  (-2.15)
FOIA  .52***  .04  .26**  .19**  .08  .23*
(reverse)  (3.46)  (.30)  (2.04)  (2.02)  (.74)  (1.73)
Constant  -2,31***  3.66***  -2.73***  -1.27**  -3.94***  -3.16***
(-3.01)  (4.59)  (-3.99)  (-.7  (-6.41)  (-5.05)
#obs  134  123  124  129  129  123
RH  .52  .54  .64  .56  .69  .70
28Table lOf. Transparency and FOIA
DATA  SET.ICRG, Averaged over the period 1984-1997
ICRG  Corruption  Rule of Law  Bureaucracy  Contract  Expropriation
Quality  Repudiation  Risk
Socialist Legal Code  .39  .67  1.12***  -. 06  .27  .65**
(1.01)  (1.63)  (3.87)  (-.14)  (.62)  (2.00)
French Legal Code  -.30*  -.09  -.24  -.60***  -. 20  -. 33
(-1.92)  (-.41)  (-1.06)  (-2.68)  (-1.27)  (-2.35)
GerTnan Legal Code  .75**  .67  .83*  .92**  .92***  .53**
(2.62)  (1.23)  (1.70)  (2.42)  (5.48)  (3.36)
Scandinavian  Legal Code  .77***  1.40***  1.12***  *79***  .53***  35**
(4.41)  (5.65)  (4.41)  (3.54)  (2.76)  (2.37)
Income  .47***  .43**'  .73***  .57***  .46**  .41***
(3.92)  (2.74)  (4.96)  (3.73)  (3.86)  (4.30)
Transparency  -.35***  -. 39***  -.34**  -.36***  -.33***
(-5.80)  (4.17)  (-3.7)  (-3.99)  (4.87)  (-5.50)
FOIA  (reverse)  .52***  .64**  .40  .72***  .45***  .30*
(2.74)  (2.57)  (1.48)  (2.81)  (2.47)  (1.95)
Constant  .92  .68  -1.47  -.07  1.10  1.95**
(1.04)  (.56)  (-1.29)  (-.07)  (1.23)  (2.53)
#obs  93  93  93  93  93  93
.71  .58  .63  .64  .67  .68
*indicates  significance  at.1 level,  **  at .05 level and *** at .01  level.
Under the assumption that more information  has greater value in democratic  rather than
autocratic  governance regimes,  an indicator for autocracy  was added to the right hand side of the
regressions.  The inclusion of the indicators  affects  some of the variables; more  information in
more autocratic environments is less useful than in more democratic environments.  However, the
effect still significant at the 5 and  10 percent levels for several of the governance  indicators.
These relationships  do not prove one way causality since it may also be that governments
that govern well have over time also been more likely to publish data.  However,  combined with
the observation that information gives power to monitor and make good choices a significant and
positive correlation between transparency and improved governance  gives  us pause to think: just
giving better data to people can  help countries do better.
29Table Ila. Transparency and Autocracy
DATA  SET: KAUFMANN,  KRAA YAND ZOIDO-LOBATON
How authorities  are selected and  Capacity of the state to  Respect of the state and
replaced  implement so  nd policies  the citizens for the rules
Voice and  Political Instability  Government  Regulatory  Rule of  Graft
Accountability  and Violence  Effectiveness  Burden  Law
Socialist Legal Code  -. 11  -. 01  -. 56***  -. 62***  -. 47***  -. 73***
(-.74)  (--07)  (-3.89)  (-3.89)  (-.36)  (-5.37)
French Legal Code  .12  -. 07  -. 04  -.03  -. 26**  -. 29**
(1.08)  (-.49)  36)  (-.38)  (-2.33  (-2.44)
German Legal Code  .47***  .33*  .26  -.24  .34**  -. 04
(2.66)  (1.67)  (1.07)  (-1.62)  (2.19)  (-.18)
Scandinavian  Legal Code  .42***  .44***  .56***  -.09  .43***  .68***
(4.26)  (3.07)  (4.22)  (-.85)  (3.46)  (4.24)
Income  .14**  .38**  .34***  21***  .47***  .37***
(2.24)  (4.59)  (4.46)  (3.31)  (7.27)  (5.04)
Transparency  -. 07  -. 07  -.13**  -.16***  -.05  -. 09*
(-1.34)  (-1.04)  (-2.17)  (-2.76)  (-1.04)  (-1.77)
Autocracy  -.13***  -.05**  -. 04***  -.03*  -. 03*  -. 05***
(-8.72)  (-2.44)  (-2.15)  (-2.20)  (-1.81)  (-2.88)
Constant  -. 14  -2.76***  -2.18**  -. 93  -3.41 ***  2.36***
(-.23)  (-3.21)  (-2.86)  (-1.4)  (-5.18)  (-3.21)
#obs  128  121  122  125  125  121
RT_  .69  .56  .64  .56  .69  .72
Table llb. Transparency and Autocracy
*DATA SET: ICRG, Averaged over the period 1984-1997
ICRG  Corruption  Rule of  Bureaucracy  Contract  Expropriation
Law  Quality  Repudiation  Risk
Socialist Legal Code  1.00***  1.39***  1.79***  .67**  .83**  I 11***
(3.84)  (4.7)  (6.62)  (2.3)  (2.53)  (4.63)
French Legal Code  -. 18  .02  -. 05  -. 47**  -. 07  -. 22
(-1.12)  (.10)  (-.23)  (-2.01)  (-.41)  (-1.6)
German Legal Code  .79**  .63**  1.02***  .87***  1.06***  .63***
(4.08)  (2.33)  (2.98)  (3.77)  (4.36)  (3.31)
Scandinavian  Legal Code  .65***  1.21***  1.01***  .64**  .48*0*  .25**
(4.30)  (5.46)  (4.2)  (2.59)  (3.51)  (2.14)
Income  .41***  .39***  .64***  .50***  .39***  .35**
(4.55)  (3.05)  (5.38)  (4.06)  (4.30)  (4.73)
Transparency  -. 22*0*  -. 23**  -.18  -.24*  -.22***  -. 22***
(-3.19)  (-2.01)  (-1.83)  (-2.19)  (-2.97)  (-3.89)
Autocracy  -.12**  -.14***  -.12***  .14***  -. ***  -. 09***
(4.89)  (4.35)  (-3.74)  (-4.27)  (4.09)  (4.79)
Constant  1.85**  1.6  -.39  1.05  2.00**  2.74***
(2.52)  (1.48)  (-.38)  (1.02)  (2.62)  (4.28)
#obs  91  91  91  91  91  91
R'  .76  .65  .68  .68  .71  .74
*indicates  significance at.  Ilevel, **  at .05 level and *** at .01 level.
The  transparency  index  developed  here  does  not  correct  for  the  quality of the  data
produced.  An  index  covering  developing  countries  only  and  constructed  by the  World  Bank
30attempts  to  incorporate  some  quality measures.18 When  some of the  above  regressions  are run
with  this  index  instead  for  developing  countries  only,  the  results  are  similar  as  shown  in
Tables  12a-b.
Table 12a. An Alternative World Bank Index: Developing  Countries Only
DATA SET: KA UFMANN, KRAA YAND ZOIDO-LOBA TON
How authorities are selected and  Capacity of the state to  Respect of the state and the
laced  implement sol  nd policies  citizens for the rules
Voice and  Political Instability  Government  Regulatory  Rule of Law  Graft
Accountability  and Violence  Effectiveness  Burden
Socialist Legal Code  -. 23  -.06  -.31*'  -.70***  -.42*"  -.52#"
(-1.23)  (-.32)  (-2.24)  (4.15)  (2.82)  (-3.76)
French Legal  Code  -.16  -.23  .01  -. 15  -.33**  -.31**
(-1.12)  (-1.38)  (.10)  (-1.30)  (-2.63)  (-2.76)
German Legal  Code  .20  -.59**  -.0005  -.97***  .13  -.35**
(1.06)  . +(2.56)  (-0.00)  (-6.00)  (.73)  (-2.16)
Income  .30***  .31s**  .24***  .32***  .36*"  .32"*
(2.96)  (2.87)  (2.81)  (4.55)  (4.35)  (3.32)
World Bank Data Index  -.18**  -. 25***  -.15''  -. 23***  -.16*  -. 06
(-2.27)  (-2.93)  (-2.63)  (4.14)  (-2.55)  (-.87)
Constant  -1.87*  -1.87*  -1.67**  -.23"*  -2.38***  -2.45***
(-1.98)  (-1.81)  (-2.22)  (4.14)  (-2.76)
#obs  96  90  91  95  95  90
R'  1  .30  .32  .27  .42  .39  .33
Table 12b. An Alternative World Bank Index: Developing  Countries Only
DATA SET. ICRG, Averaged over the period 1984-1997
ICRG  Corruption  Rule of  Bureaucracy  Contract  Expropriation
.____________  ________  __Law  Quality  Repudiation  Risk
Socialist Legal Code  .55***  1.03***  1.34***  .14  .42  .63"'
- (2.84)  (3.76)  (4.88)  (.58)  (1.42)  (2.91)
French Legal Code  -.48"  -. 26  -.37  -.83**  -.33*  -.52"'
(-2.68)  (-.94)  (-1.59)  . (-3.21)  (-1.79)  (-3.50)
Gernan Legal Code  .46**  02  -.06  .51  1.05***  .28
(2.13)  (.06)  (-.20)  (1.52)  (4.67)  (1.59)
Income  .34***  .29  .44**  .45**  .37***  .28"
(3.34)  (1.57)  (3.7)  (3.01)  (3.46)  (3.12)
World Bank Data Index  -.24**  -. 15  -.22**  -.23**  -.26*''  -.30*"
(-3.11)  (4.57)  (-2.27)  (-2.23)  (-2.99)  (4.04)
Constant  1.77"  1.30  .46  .81  1.83*  3.12**
(2.08)  (.90)  (.48)  (.69)  (2.06)  (3.99)
#obs  62  62  62  62  62  62
R
2 .43  .15 - .32  .84  .41  .51
*indicates  significance  at .l level,  **  at .05 level and ***  at .01 level.
Note: The index of Scandinavian.  Legal Code is dropped out of this regressions, because
this  World Bank index  only  has'  data for developing countries, and no  developing
countries have the legal origin as Scandinavia.
18 See  website http://www.worldbank.org/data/tas/scbpaper.pdf
31The  regressions  results  are  less  striking  for  the  freedom  of information  law  but  they
essentially  tell  the  same  story:  the  more  access  to  information  the  better  the  quality  of
governance.  There  are  three  outliers  for  these  sets  of regressions.  Switzerland,  Norway  and
Luxemburg  have  no  FOI  law/act  but have  very  good  scores  on  governance.  In  the  most
parsimonious  specification,  I find that countries that have FOI laws are much more likely to be
well governed as shown in Table 13a below.19
Table 13a. FOIA and Governance  (no outlier for FOI)
DATA  SET: KAUFMANN,  KRAAYAND  ZOIDO-LOBATON
How authorities are selected and  Capacity of the state to  Respect of the state and
_______________  replaced  implement sound policies  the citizens for the rules
Voice and  Political Instability  Government  Regulatory  Rule of  Graft
Accountability  and Violence  Effectiveness  Burden  Law
Income per capita  . *39***  .54***  .49***  .38***  .60***  .54***
(5.58)  (8.37)  (7.67)  (7.21)  (10.52)  (8.45)
FOIA  .56***  .17  .30**  .15  .15  .29*
(3.72)  (1.3)  (2.13)  -(1.39)  (.20)  (1.95)
Constant  -3.34***  4.67***  .4.18***  -3.08***  -5.04***  4.63***
(-6.07)  (-8.66)  (-8.19)  (-7.13)  (-10.83)  (-9. 11)
#obs  . 134  121  122  128  128  121
Rz  1  .46  .49  .53  .41  .61  .56
Table 13b. FOIA and Governance  (no outlier for FOI)
DATA SET: ICRG, Averaged over the period 1984-1997
ICRG  Corruption  Rule of  Bureaucracy  Contract  Expropriation
Law  Quality  Repudiation  Risk
Income per capita
t 1t .52***  .49***  .78***  .64***  .52***  .46***
(4.39)  (3.14)  (5.15)  (4.37)  (4.2)  (4.52)
FOIA  1.17**  L.39***  1.09***  1.46***  L.01***  .86**
(5.31)  (4.90)  (3.66)  (5.08)  (4.71)  (4.54)
Constant  -. 63  -. 84  -2.89**  - .95*  -. 29  .50
(-.73)  (-.74)  (-2.64)  (-1.84)  (-.34)  (.67)
#obs  91  91  91  91  91  91
R  2  .56  .44  .49  .51  .52  .48
*indicates  signifcance  at .1 level,  ** at.05 level and *** at.01 level.
9 The three outliers are omitted from this table.
32Controlling for legal origin shows that the presence  of a FOI law is correlated with good
governance through mostly three measures  in the KKZ:  voice and accountability,  and regulatory
burden and sometimes with graft and government effectiveness as well (see Tables  14a-b).
Table 14a. FOIA, Legal Origin, and Governance
DATA  SET: KAUFMANN,  KRAAYANDZOIDO-LOBATON
How authorities are selected and  Capacity of the state to  Respect of the state and the
r  laced  implement sound policies  citizens for the rules
Voice and  Political Instability  Governnent  Regulatory  Rule of  Graft
Accountability  and Violence  Effectiveness  Burden  Law
SocialistLegalCode  -. 33**  -. 02  -.60**  -.61***  -.48**  -. 79
.(-2.0)  (,.13  (4.08)  (-3.75)  (-3.36)  (-5.82)
French Legal Code  .01  -. 12  --. 07  -. 10  -. 28  -. 33*
(-1 l)  ~  (-89)  (-.60)  (-1.05)  (-2.64)  (-2.86)
Gernan  Legal Code  .48*  .30  .22  -.30  .44**  .02
(1.74)  (1.14)  (.68)  (-1.50)  (2.33)  (.07)
Scandinavian  Legal Code  *54***  .50***  .59***  -.09  .48***  .75***
(3.04)  (3.59)  (4.21)  (-.72)  (3.86)  (5.05)
Income  .38***  .54***  .47***  .36***  .57***  .51***
(5.47)  (8.26)  (7.62)  (7.41)  (10.9)  (8.6)
FOIA  .55  *  .06  .31**  .24**  .10  .26*
(3.71)  (.52)  (2.34)  (2.55)  (.92)  (1.92)
Constant  -3.20***  . 4,54***  -3.93***  -2.82**  4.5**  4.06*
(-5.77)  (-7.93)  (-7.73)  (-6.81)  (-10.31)  (-8.93)
#obs  137  124  125  131  131  124
R'  .52  .53  .62  .50  .69  .69
Table 14b. FOIA, Legal Origin, and Governance
*DATA SET: ICRG, Averaged over the period 1984-1997
ICRG  Corruption  Rule of  Bureaucracy  Contract  Expropriation
._______  _______  Law  Quality  Repudiation  Risk
Socialist Legal Code  .61  .90**  1.34***  .17  .48  .86*
- (1.64)  (2.29)  (4.77)  . (.4)  (1.12)  (2.76)
French Legal Code  -.28  -. 08  -.23  -.56**  -.18  -. 31*
(-1.51)  (-.34)  (-.92,  (-2.3)  (-99)  (-1.86)
German Legal Code  1.12***  1.05*  1.19**  1.30***  1.27***  .88***
(3.42)  (1.85)  (2.32)  (3.19)  (6.04)  (46
Scandinavian  Legal Code  .96**  1.60***  1.30***  .99***  .71***  .53**
(3.98)  (5.09)  (4.5)  (3.59)  (2.8)  (2.56)
Income  .58V**  .55***  .84*  *  .68***  .57***  .520*
(4.39)  (3.28)  (5.36)  (4.21)  (4.35)  (4.91)
FOIA  .79***  .95***  .67**  1.00***  .70***  .56**
(3.59)  (3.39)  (2.26)  (3.5)  (3.32)  (2.97)
Constant  -.83  -1.24  -3.17***  -1.92  -. 53  .30
____________(-.88)  (-1.01)  (-2.82)  (-1.64)  (-.58)  (.39)
#obs  94  94  94  94  94  94
- R
2 .62  .5  .58  .59  .59  .57
*indicates  signifzcance at.) level, **  at .05 level and ***  at .01 level.
These  results  hold under  various  permutations  of the  relationship;  such  as  when  state
ownership  of the media, various continent dummies and transparency are added. Controlling  for
33newspaper  circulation,  freedom  of the  press  and  a measure  of autocracy  does not  change  the
basic results (see Tables  15a-b,  16a-b).
Table 15a. Governance vs. Legal Origin, FOIA and Circulation
DATA  SET: KAUFMANN,  KRAA YAND  ZOIDO-LOBA TON
How authorities are selected and  Capacity of the state to  Respect of the state and
n placed  implement sound policies  the citizens for the rules
Voice and  Political  Instability  Government  Regulatory  Rule of  Graft
Accountability  and Violence  Effectiveness  Burden  Law
Socialist Legal Code  -. 34*  -. 03  -.66***  .79***  -.59***  -. 75***
(-1.71)  (-.19)  (-3.53)  (4.35)  (-3.51)  (4.41)
French Legal Code  -.04  -.19  -.18  -. 05  -.37***  40e**
(-.26)  (-1.29)  (-1.36)  (-.54)  (-2.96)  (-2.85)
German Legal Code  .44  .28  .16  -. 40  .41*  .02
(1.4)  (.94)  (.47)  (-1.6)  (1.9)  (.04)
Scandinavian  Legal Code  *57***  *54***  *59***  -. 08  .52***  .80***
(2.94)  (3.63)  (3.65)  (-.86)  (4.03)  (4.82)
Income  .23  35***  .41***  .01  .48***  53***
(1.56)  (3.25)  (3.44)  (.13)  (5.24)  (4.49)
Circulation  .11  .09  .04  .26**  .03  -. 02
(1.33)  (1.28)  (.50)  (4.42)  (.43)  (-.34)
FOIA  .57***  .04  .29*  .19*  .12  .27*
(3.35)  (.32)  (1.92)  (1.74)  (.97)  (1.72)
Constant  -2.36**  -3.28***  -3.52***  -. 80  -3.86  -4.17***
(-2.47)  (-4.35)  (4.62)  (-1  29)  (-5. 77)
# obs  103  101  101  3  101
RI  .55  .50  .60  .56  .67  .68
Table 15b. Governance vs. Legal Origin, FOIA and Circulation
*DATA SET: ICRG, Averaged over the period  1984-199  7
ICRG  Corruption  Rule of  Bureaucracy  Contract  Expropriation
Law  Quality  Repudiation  Risk
Socialist Legal Code  .32  .64*  1.12***  .02  .09  49*
(I .00)  (1.79)  (3.88)  (.04)  (.27)  (2.08)
French Legal Code  -.37**  -.26  -. 25  -. 68**  -.20  -. 34**
(-2.01)  (-1.05)  (-.96)  (-2.62)  (-1.23)  (-2.24)
German Legal Code  79*  .76  .93  1.18**  .81***  .46*
(2.00)  (1.24)  (1.57)  (2.49)  (2.78)  (1.7)
Scandinavian  Legal Code  .83***  1.47**  1.24***  *97***  .53**  .35*
(3.52)  (4.62)  (4.09)  (3.22)  (2.36)  (1.89)
Income  .32*  .40*  .60***  57**  .16  .17
(1.97)  (1.77)  (2.89)  (2.62)  (1.09)  (1.34)
Circulation  19**  .14  .19  .05  *33**  .27***
(2.06)  (.99)  (1.44)  (.41)  (3.68)  (3.52)
FOIA  .69***  79***  .58*  1.02***  .56***  42*
(3.15)  (2.81)  (1.89)  (3.41)  (2.93)  (2.38).
Constant  .45  -.41  -2.07  -1.17  1.36  1.98**
(.46)  (-.30)  (-1.62)  (-.88)  (1.52)  (2.48)
#obs  8.2  82  82  82  82  82
.67  .53  .58  .60  .66  .63
*indicates significance at .I level, **  at .05 level and *** at .01 leveL
34Table 16a. FOIA and Autocracy
DATA  SET: KAUFMANN, KRAAYANDZOIDO-LOBATON
How authorities are selected and  Capacity of the state to  Respect of the state and
replaced  implement sound policies  the citizens for the rules
Voice and  Political Instability  Government  Regulatory  Rule of  Graft
Accountabili  and Violence  Effectiveness  Burden  Law
ty  I
Socialist Legal  Code  -.17  .03  -.54***  -.56***  -. 46***  -. 72***
(-1.31)  (.16)  (-3.79)  (-3.4)  (-3.2)  (-5.53)
French Legal Code  .14  -. 08  -. 01  -.03  -.27**  -27*
(1.31)  _(-56)  (-.13)  (-.3)  (-2.37)  (-2.23)
German Legal Code  45**  .29  .22  -. 30*  43**  .001
(2.16)  _(14)  (.73)  -177  (2.54)  (0.0)
Scandinavian  Legal Code  .33**  .42***  .52***  -.14  .42***  .65***
(2.63)  (2.87)  (3.77)  (-1.12)  (3.22)  (4.51)
Income  .12**  42**  .38***  .28***  50***  .40***
(2.17)  539)  (478)  (4.7)  (7.68)  (5.33)
Autocracy  .13***  -05**  -.04*  .04***  -.03*  -.05+**
(-9.07)  (-2.74)  (-2.43)  (-2.75)  (-1.85)  (-2.89)
FOIA  .46***  .02  .25**  .20**  .07  .19
(3.97)  (.16)  (2.00)  (2.02)  (.63)  (I.53)
Constant  -.37  -3.30***  -2.91***  -1.94***  -3.82***  -2.85**
(-.70121)  (45  (407)  (-3.51)  -62  (-4.23)
#obs  129  121  122  126  126  121
R
2 .72  .56  .63  .52  .69  .72
Table 16b. FOIA and Autocracy
*DATA SET: ICRG, Averaged over the period 1984-1997
ICRG  Corruption  Rule of  Bureaucracy  Contract  Expropriation
Law  Quality  Repudiation  Risk
SocialistLegalCode  1i17***  1.56***  1.97***  *77**  1.01***  1.34***
_____________  _  (4.13)  (5.17)  (8.36)  (2.42)  (2.87)  (5.55)
French Legal Code  -. 08  11  .02  -.33  .03  -.13
____________  _  (-.50)  (.49)  (.09)  (-1.48)  (.17)  (-.92)
German Legal Code  .84***  .71  *93***  .99***  1.07***  .65**
(5.28)  (2.17)  (3.09)  (4.78)  (6.10)  (4.65)
Scandinavian  Legal  Code  .65***  1.20***  1.00***  .64**  .48***  260**
(3.94)  (5.11)  (4.14)  (2.92)  (2.8)  (1.83)
Income  39***  .36***  .63***  47***  .38***
(4.94)  (3.02)  (5.43)  (4.49)  (4.64)  (5.00)
Autocracy  .14***  .16***  -.15**  .15***  -.12***  - 12**
(-6.96)  (-5.67)  (-5.22)  (-5.51)  (-5.94)  (-6.51)
FOIA  .45***  47**  .29  .65***  .42***  27*
(2.88)  (2.26)  (1.20)  (2.89)  (2.67)  (2.03)
Constant  1.40**  1.23  -. 71  .54  1.55**  2.24**
(2.35)  (1.28)  (-.77)  (.68)  (2.54)  (4.06)
#obs  91  91  91  91  91  91
R  .76  .64  .68  .69  .71  .71
*indicates  signifi  cance at.1 level,  **  at .05 level and *** at .01 level.
Economic  theory  tells  us  that  information  is  needed  to  make  sound  economic  and
political  choices,  to  monitor  agents  and  reward  or  punish  accordingly.  Better  availability  of
economic  data  and  the  ability of people  to  demand  and receive  the  information  they  need  is
35highly  correlated  with  governance.  Governments  that  do  not  produce,  organize  and  share
information  will  be  hampered  in  policymaking.  Good  policymaking  requires  up-to-date
information  on the  economic  situation;  good policymaking  requires  the  sharing of information
for better coordination,  analysis and monitoring.
These two sets of investigations have demonstrated that informnation  flows as proxied by
the  two  indices,  the  transparency  index  and  the  access  to  information  index,  are  positively
correlated with the quality of governance.  Better governance  has been  empirically demonstrated
to be correlated  with higher  growth.  Extrapolating,  there  is  a close  relationship  between better
information flows and how fast economies grow.
Better decision-making  in economic  and political markets boosts  growth.  We also know
that  many  different  policy  choices  and  institutional  features  affect  information  flows.
Governments  can choose  to publish data and  other  information  on their activities  and they can
choose whether or not to establish  the regulatory system and organizational  structure that allows
production and dissemination of data and access to information. Thus, in the policy guidance that
development  advisors  seek to  impart,  advising  countries  on  the importance  of processing  and
sharing  data,  on  making  this  data  widely  available  is policy  advice  that  can  boost  economic
growth.  This paper has not demonstrated  causality from more transparency to better institutional
flows.  It is likely that better governments  are also more likely to promote more transparency.  Yet
it does give us some food for thought.
More  research  is  definitely  needed  to  take  a  closer  look  at  the  relationship  between
transparency and governance  or information and economic growth.  This paper provides a simple
way to quantitatively  assess  whether the  magnitude  of the association  is significant  and worth
another look.
36The  indicators  used  in  the  paper  could  be  developed  further.  For  example,  the
transparency  indicator  could  be  strengthened  by  considering  not  just  the  frequency  and
availability  of data  but  also  the  quality of the  data  produced by  governments.  Moreover,  my
definition of "availability"  probably overestimates  the  actual  availability  of data in developing
countries and could be fine-tuned. Expanding the data set (e.g. to look at social indicators)  would
also be another direction in which the indicator could be developed.  The FOI indicator could be
substantially  strengthened  by considering  how these  laws are actually implemented,  if at all, in
countries. Another issue would be whether people are allowed to use the information they obtain:
for  example  are  newspaper  journalists  able  to  print  information  they  obtain  without  fear  of
imprisonment - harsh libel and defamation  laws would affect journalists'  behaviour. Looking at
other restrictions, such as licensing of the media to prevent entry- would also enrich the analysis.
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40ApPendix A: A World Bank Index for Data Ouality for Developing  Countries
This index scores  the statistical  practice of 125  developing countries  with populations  of
one  million  or  more.  A  high  score  indicates  compliance  with  good  statistical  practice.  The
assessment  is based  on the following  10  factors:  1) base year for the national  accounts e.g.  is it
within the  last  10 years,  2)  year of latest BoP manual used,  3)  up-to-date  reporting of external
debt,  4)  whether  foreign  trade  price  indexes  are  compiled,  5)  population  and  6)  agricultural
censuses are within the last  10 years,  7) the vital statistics  registry is complete, as reported to the
UN, 8) the CPI basket has been updated within the last 10 years, 9) sub-annual production  index
is compiled  and  10)  the  country subscribes to  the  IMF's  Special  Data Dissemination  Standard.
The  Lunderlying  information  is  from1  the primary  data docunmenitation  in the latest edition of the
World Bank's  World Development  Indicators and the  MF's International  Finance Statistics.
What is used  in this paper is an index composed from the information  from this table, i.e.,
those countries with original  scores of 9-10 gets "6", 7-8 gets "5",  5-6 gets "4", and so on till
the last group of 0 gets "1".
Website: http://www.worldbank.org/data/tas/scbpaper.pdf
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